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Abstract: A driving force behind much of the literature on the non-identity 
problem is the widely shared intuition that actions or policies that change who 
comes into existence don't, as a result, lose their morally problematic features. 
We hypothesize that this intuition isn’t entirely shared by the general public, 
which might have widespread implications concerning how to best motivate 
public support for large-scale, identity-affecting policies like those involved in 
climate change mitigation. To test our hypothesis, we ran a behavioural 
economic experiment, a version of the well-known dictator game, designed to 
mimic the public's morally loaded behaviour in identity-affecting choice 
problems. As predicted, we found that the public does seem to behave more 
selfishly when making identity-affecting choices. We further hypothesised that 
one possible mechanism involved in this change is the notion of harm that 
plays a role in the public’s normatively loaded decision making. So, during our 
study, we also solicited subjects’ attitudes about harm, in particular about 
whether the “dictators” had done harm through their choices. The data suggest 
that substantial portions of the population each employ distinct notions of 
harm in their normative thinking, which raises some puzzling features about 
the public’s normative thinking that call out for further empirical examination. 
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
If we want human life to continue on this planet into the foreseeable future, then we 
need to find a way to motivate the public to care more deeply about the welfare of 
people who don’t yet exist. A sizeable portion of the population seems largely 
indifferent about what kind of world we leave to those future people, and, as the 2016 
US election made clear, this is currently a large enough group to erase the fleeting 
progress made on matters like climate change mitigation. Although there have been 
some recent attempts to fashion conservationist arguments that could motivate even 
Homo economicus (e.g., Broome 2018), the vast majority of environmental 
economists agree that solving the climate crisis, and conserving our resources more 
generally, comes at a serious cost to the current generation. So it seems our only viable 
option, assuming we maintain our democracies and refrain from brainwashing, is moral 
motivation. We need to find a better way to get the public to feel a moral obligation 
to leave a healthy planet to those people who don’t yet exist. 
  
Unfortunately, our obligations on these kinds of problems, where people don’t yet 
exist, are more slippery than most. Our choices between large scale policies will, over 
a long enough period of time, change which people end up coming into existence. It 
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thus becomes hard to make the argument that we are leaving an unhealthy planet to 
these people. After all, they wouldn’t have existed if we had chosen some other policy. 
This moral quirk, usually referred to as the non-identity problem (following Parfit 
1984), is now widely recognized as a serious philosophical problem—one we must 
solve if we are to give a proper account of our duties to future generations. And 
environmental ethicists like Gardiner (2012) tend to see this problem as a key 
roadblock in generating action on climate change (i.e., as a key contributor to what he 
calls the “intergenerational storm”). Even the recent IPCC 2014 report mentions the 
non-identity problem as a key theoretical roadblock to action on climate change 
(Kolstad et al. 2014, p.216). 
  
But does the non-identity problem really make a practical difference when it comes to 
motivating the public to support policies which treat future generations responsibly? 
One might think the obvious answer is “No”, since the public doesn’t generally know 
about the problem. And even if they knew the rough details, they might not be able to 
really grasp the issue. But if we take philosophers’ intuitions as a general guide to moral 
intuitions and judgements more generally, there is a deeper reason for scepticism about 
the practical relevance of the non-identity problem. A central driving force in the 
literature on the non-identity problem is the strong intuition that, just because a certain 
choice changes the identity of those affected, the choice doesn’t thereby lose its 
morally problematic features. In other words, an identity-affecting choice seems just as 
wrong as the parallel choice that doesn’t change who comes into existence. This 
intuition is so widespread among philosophers working on this problem that even 
those who think the intuition is ultimately mistaken admit to sharing it anyway (see 
e.g., Boonin 2014). So, the problem doesn’t generally move philosophers into thinking 
we are morally off the hook when our choices affect who comes into existence. Why 
think the general public should be moved any differently? If the intuitions of the public 
match the intuitions of these philosophers, the non-identity problem raises no special 
problem for moral motivation after all. 
  
In this project, we set out to see if this is really the case. Our experience from teaching 
the non-identity problem actually clashed with what is generally accepted in the 
literature: non-philosophers often do see a substantial moral difference between 
identity-affecting cases and the parallel cases that don’t change who comes into 
existence. One of us found it rather difficult to convince the students that the non-
identity problem really was a problem, because many students seem to see a substantial 
moral difference between the cases meant to motivate the problem. Thus, they didn’t 
see why this was a puzzle worth theorizing about in the first place. Because of this, we 
worry that the optimistic story told above is mistaken, in which case the non-identity 
problem may indeed pose a special problem for moral motivation. In order to see 
whether this is the case, we developed a behavioural economic experiment, a version 
of the well-known dictator game, which was designed to elicit the public’s behaviour 
in identity-affecting choice problems. We admit that the study we developed is only 
suggestive, since it doesn’t really change which people come into existence, and the 
control group isn’t straightforwardly “harmed”. Getting such a study past the 
university’s ethics board would be tricky indeed! That said, what we found should 
strike many as rather surprising nonetheless. 
  
Not only is a large portion of the population fully able to follow the details of identity-
affecting choice problems, the public is also much more selfish when confronted with 
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such choices. One possible explanation for this change is that a substantial portion of 
the public employs, in their normative thinking, a version of what has been called the 
counterfactual comparative account of harm. On this notion of harm, an agent cannot 
be harmed if she hasn’t been made worse off, and so the agents who are causally 
downstream in identity-affecting actions wouldn’t count as being harmed (since they 
wouldn’t have existed otherwise). Since we designed our study to parallel this feature 
of identity-affecting choice problems, we were also able to probe the relationship 
between giving behaviour and judgments of harm. What we found suggests that 
something like the counterfactual comparative notion of harm does indeed play a role 
in the public’s normative thinking, and the role it plays does seem to have some effect 
on giving behaviour. That said, there actually seems to be a substantial split within the 
public over which notion of harm to employ when making normative evaluations, 
which calls out for further empirical examination. 
 
We should pause to admit, from the outset, that there are a number of limitations of 
the studies we ran. In particular, we obviously aren’t recreating an identity-affecting 
choice problem per se, and there are a number questions we could have asked that 
would have allowed us to probe the public’s normative thinking more deeply. But we 
hope that the results we sketch below are striking enough to motivate others to run 
their own experiments along similar lines. We think the end result would be a more 
complete understanding of the public’s normative reasoning in their decision making, 
which could then be used to better motivate the public to support policies that protect 
future generations. 
  
Our plan is as follows. In Section 2, we offer a sketch of the non-identity problem, 
which we understand as a clash between moral intuitions and other common 
assumptions or judgements made by normative ethicists. In Section 3, we lay out the 
details of our experiment and list the data we found that are most relevant to the non-
identity problem and notions of harm in general. In Section 4, we argue from the data 
to some provisional conclusions concerning the non-identity problem and its practical 
implications. In Section 5, we explain the possible relevance of the data to debates over 
the proper understanding of harm. In Section 6, we discuss objections, some of which 
we must concede will require further study to fully address. We conclude in Section 7. 
 
  
2. Background on the Non-Identity Problem 
  
The non-identity problem arises because there are some acts that strike us as intuitively 
immoral, and yet the acts effectively change which people come into existence. Take 
the following case: 
  
Wilma is interested in having a baby. Wilma’s doctor tells her that she has a 
condition such that if she conceives now, any child she conceives will suffer 
from incurable blindness. However, her doctor also tells her that this result is 
not unavoidable. If Wilma waits to conceive, and instead takes a pill every day 
for two months prior to conceiving, then she will conceive a child who is not 
afflicted with incurable blindness. Had Wilma waited and taken the pill, she 
would have conceived and given birth to a perfectly sighted boy she would 
have named ‘Rocks.’ However, she decides not to take the pill in favor of 
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conceiving immediately. As a result, she conceives and gives birth to an 
incurably blind baby girl. She names this child ‘Pebbles.’ (Purves 2014)1 
  
Intuitively, Wilma does something immoral by choosing not to wait to conceive. The 
initially plausible reason her act is immoral is because she has done something wrong 
to Pebbles, who is born blind. And the very natural reason this act seems to wrong 
Pebbles is because Wilma seems to have harmed Pebbles by causing Pebbles to be 
born blind. But on closer inspection, it’s difficult to really claim that Wilma has harmed 
Pebbles at all. After all, if Wilma had decided to wait to conceive, Pebbles wouldn’t 
have been better off. Pebbles wouldn’t have been at all—Rocks would have been born 
instead. Given the natural thought that you can’t harm someone if you haven’t made 
her worse off, Pebbles hasn’t been harmed. So, it seems Pebbles hasn’t been wronged, 
and Wilma obviously hasn’t wronged anyone else either. So, it seems Wilma hasn’t 
done anything immoral after all. A number of very natural thoughts lead to a clash 
with the strong intuition that Wilma has acted immorally in this case. 
  
More apropos of our own motivations in undertaking this project, take another kind 
of case, inspired by one originally sketched by Parfit (1984): 
  
The US Government in the year 2020 is split between two very different large-
scale social policies. Policy C (think “Conservation”) involves a range of 
changes in environmental policy, including: sizeable tax increases on synthetic 
fertilizers, plastic by-products, carbon emissions, and automobiles and 
gasoline; substantial spending increases on mass transit and carbon neutral 
power generation; and zoning changes around population centres to encourage 
people to live closer to their places of work. Policy D (think “Depletion”) 
involves a business as usual strategy, where resources will be depleted, carbon 
will be emitted, and other pollutants will be dispersed into the environment at 
roughly their current levels. The 2020 US Government ends up choosing 
Policy D, even though Policy C would have required only modest sacrifices to 
the current generation. In the year 2220, the US population lives in a heavily 
degraded environment. If the 2020 US Government had instead chosen Policy 
C, then by 2220 a completely different population would have inhabited an 
environment roughly similar to the one we enjoy today. 
  
Much like in the previous case, intuitively, the US Government’s choice was immoral. 
The initially plausible reason is that the people within the future population under 
Policy D has been wronged by that choice. And the natural reason behind this 
judgement is that the people within that future population have been harmed by Policy 
D, because they were left with a dirty and depleted environment to live in. But, on 
closer inspection, this is also a hard case to make. The people within the population 
under Policy D weren’t made worse off, because, if Policy C had been chosen, a 
completely different set of people would have existed by 2220. So, given the natural 
thought that you can’t harm someone if you don’t make them worse off, no particular 
individual within the future population under Policy D was harmed by the US 
Government choosing that policy. So, it looks like no individuals in that population 
                                               
1 This is Purves’s succinct restatement of an example by Boonin (2008), (2014), which was in turn a 
revised version of the original example given by Parfit (1984).  
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were wronged. So, it seems that the choice wasn’t immoral after all. And this clashes 
with our strong initial intuition about the case. 
  
What, precisely, is the problem here? As we see it, it involves a clash between the 
strong initial intuition we tend to have about cases like these and a series of other 
seemingly reasonable judgements or assumptions. First, we have a strong intuition that 
the act or policy in question is immoral. Second, we tend to assume that if an act or 
policy were immoral, this must stem from the fact that the act or policy wrongs 
someone. Third, we also tend to assume that wronging another person requires doing 
harm to that person. And, finally, we tend to assume that doing harm to another person 
requires making that person worse off than they would have been otherwise. But in 
these non-identity cases, no one is made worse off, and, if our other assumptions are 
correct, the act couldn’t have been immoral in the first place. So, either our initial 
intuition is wrong, or one of our other reasonable seeming assumptions or judgements 
must be wrong. 
  
Philosophers have attempted different solutions to the problem by tackling each of 
these four collectively inconsistent pieces of the puzzle. Taking them in reverse order, 
some philosophers have argued that harming another doesn’t require making that 
person worse off in the way we typically think, e.g., Hanser (1990), Meyer (2003), 
Harman (2004, 2009), Rivera-López (2009), and Shiffrin (2009), or that we can 
otherwise account for how the person/people in the non-identity cases are indeed 
harmed, e.g., Gardner (2015). Some have attempted to deny that wronging a person 
requires that you have harmed that person, e.g., Kumar (2003, 2009, 2015)2 and Hurley 
and Weinberg (2015). Some have attempted to explain how the act or policy could be 
immoral without strictly speaking wronging anyone, which was Parfit’s own attempted 
solution (1984) (see also, e.g., Buchanan et al. 2000 and Steinbock 2009). And some 
have argued that our strong intuition, i.e., that the act or policy is immoral in much the 
same way that it would be if the same person or people were affected, is simply 
mistaken, e.g., Boonin (2014), Heyd (2009), and Weinberg (2014). 
  
But regardless of which strategy these philosophers prefer, each of them shares the 
strong intuition that non-identity cases are immoral in much the same way as their 
parallel same-person cases are immoral. Even those like Boonin (2014) who end up 
arguing that this intuition is mistaken, and that the actions in non-identity cases are not 
actually immoral, still agree that this intuition is both strong and widespread. So, in a 
sense, this assumption that the act or policy does not receive moral absolution simply 
because different people come into existence seems to be a central driving force in the 
literature on the non-identity problem. If we take these authors at their word, they all 
share the strong intuition, their colleagues tend to share the intuition (Parfit 1984, 
pp.359,363), and their students tend to share the intuition (Boonin 2014, p.25). 
  
As alluded to earlier, we’ve had a somewhat different experience, at least when it comes 
to non-philosophers like our students. We have found it somewhat difficult to 
motivate the non-identity problem as a genuine puzzle worth our concern, because a 
number of students see an intutive moral difference once they realize different people 
                                               
2 See Finneron-Burns (2016) and Gibbs (2016) on somewhat related contractualist solutions to the non-
identity problem.  
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will come into existence depending on which choice is made. In other words, it seemed 
to us that the central intuition that drives the whole literature on the non-identity 
problem might not be widely shared outside of our (relatively small) community of 
philosophers. If our hunch is correct, perhaps this could raise some debunking worries 
for that central intuition, since it could be that philosophers are relying upon intuitions 
not widely shared in the general public.3 Although we think there is probably 
something to that line of concern, our worry here is of a more practical nature. 
  
Think back to the choice between Policy C and Policy D. Regardless of what analysis 
any particular philosopher settles upon concerning that case, we can assume that this 
philosopher’s intuition tells her that a nation that chooses Policy D over Policy C has 
done something seriously immoral. Perhaps her considered judgement will reject that 
assessment in the end. Nonetheless, if she shares the intuition that drives the non-
identity literature, then she at least initially judges Policy D as the wrong choice. Now, 
many philosophers working on the non-identity problem see it as having a genuine 
practical relevance. The idea is that if we can’t “solve” the non-identity problem, then 
we will have a hard time justifying why people ought to support policies like Policy C 
over Policy D. But, from a motivational perspective, the solution they seek might be 
rather irrelevant. If the general public generally shares the intuitions and judgements 
of the philosophers working on the non-identity problem, then they should also think 
that the fact that different populations come into existence under each policy doesn’t 
make a moral difference. The public, in short, should be just as motivated to support 
Policy C over Policy D after they grasp that the policies change who exists as they were 
before they had that realization. So, if philosophers’ intuitions are fairly typical among 
the population at large, then the non-identity problem may prove to be a mere 
theoretical puzzle of little practical relevance.4 
  
If, on the other hand, the intuitions of philosophers in non-identity cases aren’t 
representative of the population, we are in a very different situation. If the public’s 
moral intuitions and judgements quickly shift once they grasp that they are dealing 
with a non-identity case, then we should expect substantial differences in their 
behaviour. In particular, we should expect that they will be less likely to support 
policies that involve some sacrifice on their part once they realize that the choice 
between policies leaves them in a non-identity case. This, in turn, would have some 
implications for how we, philosophers, ought to talk about these kinds of problems 
with the public. For example, it might be a morally bad idea to broadcast this particular 
philosophical problem to the public, e.g. on YouTube, podcasts or popular periodicals, 
or to thinkers in other fields who might pass it along to the public second hand. 
(Indeed, it might be a morally bad idea for us to have written this article.) As our data 
                                               
3 There is now a substantial empirical literature examining whether the intuitions of the folk come apart 
from the intuitions of philosophers, possibly in systematic ways. Although the evidence is by no means 
decisive, Tobia, Buckwalter and Stitch (2013) have found that philosophers and non-philosophers have 
different moral intuitions. Machery (2017, chapter 2) provides a helpful overview of empirical work 
done exploring the impact that education and socioeconomic factors have on philosophical judgment. 
More generally, the thought that philosophers systematically have different intuitions underlies the so-
called ‘expertise defence’ of traditional armchair philosophy (Nado 2014).  
4 This is not to say that there won’t be other issues in intergenerational ethics distinct from the non-
identity problem that are practically relevant, as opposed to mere theoretical puzzles. See Gardiner 
(2012, chapter 5) for an argument to this effect. 
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will make clearer in what follows, it also suggests that it might speak against the 
seemingly promising strategy of focusing on considerations of harm when attempting 
to motivate the public to act more environmentally conscientiously , as suggested by 
Rottman et al. (2015). If the public’s intuitions on this matter are very different than 
those of philosophers, we might be in real trouble if we both focus our moral 
motivational efforts on harm considerations and then inform the public about the non-
identity problem. 
  
So, do the intuitions and judgements of philosophers mirror those of the general 
public? 
  
 
3. Two Experiments 
  
Our experiments are designed with two main goals in mind. First we aim to determine 
whether individuals are less likely to make altruistic sacrifices in identity-affecting 
choice problems. Second, we aim to examine the role that considerations of harm 
might play in any changes of behaviour when making identity-affecting choices. To 
satisfy the dual goals of examining the changes in behaviour as well as the role that 
normative attitudes might have played in such changes, we rely on a mix of traditional 
survey methods and experimental methods from behavioural economics. In this 
section, we provide some background on our tools of choice before describing the 
experimental set-up. 
 
Although philosophers are now largely familiar with the survey methods commonly 
used in experimental philosophy, experimental methods from behavioural economics 
have received significantly less use in the philosophical literature.5 And yet, the 
experimental methods of economics, since they explicitly were devised to explore 
behaviour, are particularly promising given our goal of identifying the behavioural 
consequences of identity-affecting considerations.6 Experiments in economics tend to 
proceed by observing how subjects actually behave in a particular scenario, as opposed 
to merely reporting how subjects believe they would behave, as is common in other 
fields like psychology. In order to observe actual behaviours, it is necessary to 
construct experiments where the subjects’ decisions have real consequences.  In typical 
economics experiments, subjects make decisions with full knowledge that those 
decisions will have financial consequences for themselves and, in some cases, other 
participants. 
 
We believe that the inclusion of methods from experimental economics carries a 
number of benefits. First, most theories that have practical implications don’t make 
predictions about how subjects say they would behave in some environment, but 
instead make predictions about how subjects will actually behave. As a result, 
experiments that primarily rely on responses to vignettes or hypothetical scenarios can 
only be used to assess such theories in very special circumstances (i.e., only in cases 
                                               
5 Although, see, e.g., Bicchieri and Xiao (2009), Bicchieri and Chavez (2010), and Bruner et al. (2018). 
6 In what follows, we will often drop the qualifier ‘behavioural’ in ‘behavioural economics’, simply to 
avoid redundancy. This is not to suggest that the only experiments that economists run have to do with 
overt behaviour, or that behavioural economics is the only sub-field of economics where experiments 
are run. Such suggestions would be false on both counts. 
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where what subjects report they would do closely tracks what they actually would do). 
Second, and more importantly for us, methods from experimental economics already 
have an established track record for effectively probing the social preferences of 
individuals. For example, such methods have been used to register the extent to which 
individuals are driven by an aversion to inequitable outcomes, such as Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), and the extent to which individuals act out of self-interest as opposed 
to acting out of a concern for others.7 Tracking a subject’s predictions about how they 
would behave in a hypothetical scenario is not a particularly reliable means of 
registering such preferences, since subjects have little reason not to present themselves 
as being more caring and altruistic than they really are.  
 
As mentioned, our goal is in part to determine whether individuals behave differently 
when tasked to make identity-affecting decisions. To best understand whether this will 
lead to, say, more self-regarding behaviour, we need to place subjects in conditions 
that approximate the salient features of the actual scenario of interest. For obvious 
reasons, we cannot conduct an experiment that forces individuals to make choices that 
in turn directly cause different individuals to come into existence, as occurs in true 
non-identity cases. That said, we can recreate strategic scenarios that, we believe, 
approximate the relevant and salient features of the original scenarios of interest. 
Behaviour in this proxy condition will provide us with useful insights. We now turn to 
descriptions of the experiments themselves. 
  
3.1 Experiment 1 (the “Standard Dictator Game”) 
  
Our first experiment allows us to register the behaviour and normative attitudes of 
individuals when confronted by a non-identity-affecting decision. We then compare 
these to the results of our second experiment to determine how behaviour and 
normative attitudes are altered when identity-affecting issues become relevant. (We 
focus on subjects’ attitudes regarding harm and fairness in both conditions.) 
  
The main task of experiment 1 is the so-called dictator game. The dictator game 
consists of two individuals: a proposer (Player A) and a recipient (Player B). Player A 
is given a fixed amount of money (in this case 1.00 USD) and must determine how to 
allocate this amount between herself and Player B. Player A can choose to retain the 
whole amount of $1.00 for herself. Or she can choose to share with Player B, by 
transferring to her counterpart any amount she pleases up to $1.00, in $0.10 
increments. Importantly, the allocation chosen by Player A cannot be contested by 
Player B. Player B is unable to protest or veto the proposed allocation. In this sense, 
Player A is “the dictator,” as their decision is final. (We occasionally refer to Player A 
as such in what follows.) 
  
If we were to assume that subjects only care about money , we would expect every 
Player A to pocket the entire bonus, leaving nothing for their corresponding Player Bs. 
But this is very far from what behavioural economists observe when these games are 
run in the laboratory. More often than not, Player A transfers some non-zero amount 
of the bonus to Player B. In fact, transfers can be quite generous. According to a meta-
analysis conducted by Christoph Engel (Engel, 2011) that draws on over 100 
                                               
7 See Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2008) for an overview of experimental work on altruism. 
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experiments, those in the role of proposer on average leave a total of 28% of the total 
bonus to their counterpart. This is compelling evidence that individuals have other-
regarding preferences of some form or another, which makes the dictator game a 
promising tool for probing the nature and limits of other-regarding preferences. 
  
3.1.1 Experiment 1: Experimental set-up  
 
We recruited 354 subjects from the US using Amazon Mechanical Turk in the northern 
winter of 2017.8 Subjects were provided a fixed participation fee of 0.50 USD and told 
they could earn up to an additional 1.00 USD. Anonymity was guaranteed as no 
identifying information was released in the course of the experiment. Finally, the 
experiment on average took participants over three and a half minutes to complete 
and subjects were asked some basic demographic questions at the end of the 
experiment. 
  
The main task of the experiment was the dictator game. Participants were first 
provided with a description of the dictator game. To ensure comprehension, 
participants were then asked to complete a quick two question quiz about the dictator 
game. Those who failed the comprehension check were forced to restart the 
experiment from the beginning. Subjects were either assigned to the role of dictator 
(Player A) or recipient (Player B) and were told they would remain in these roles for 
the entirety of the experiment. Finally, Player As were all asked to determine how they 
would like to split the $1.00 bonus between themselves and their randomly chosen 
Player B counterpart. Player A was informed that this was the only task of the game 
and was reassured that their identity would not be revealed to their counterpart. The 
allocation was later revealed to Player B, but this revelation was the only form of 
contact between the Player As and their respective Player Bs in the experiment. 
  
After Player A chose the allocation, and after the allocation was revealed to Player B, 
each was given a compulsory exit survey respectively (i.e., completion was a 
requirement for payment). In addition to basic demographic information, we also 
asked three questions of philosophical relevance. First, Player A participants were 
asked whether they thought the allocation they made to Player B harmed Player B, and 
Player B participants were likewise asked whether they felt the allocation they received 
from Player A had harmed them. (Call these the “specific harm questions.”) Second, 
both participants were asked whether they felt that any Player A that gives a $0 
allocation to her respective Player B does harm by making that choice. (Call this the 
“generic harm question.”) Finally, both participants were asked whether they thought 
the allocation proposed by Player A was ‘fair’. (Call this the “fairness question.”)9  
 
3.1.2: Experiment 1: Results 
  
We found Player A participants on average transferred a total of $0.238 to their Player 
B counterpart. As mentioned, a recent meta-analysis of dictator games uncovered an 
                                               
8 We limited the subjects to US participants, because using the low stakes that we use in the present 
study was shown to have little effect on giving behaviour in the dictator game within the US population, 
but not, for example, within the Indian population. See Raihaini et al. (2013) for details.  
9 The exact wording for all questions is available in the supplementary materials available at [Removed]. 
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average transfer rate of 28% of the pot. This suggests our results are fairly consistent 
with what has previously been observed in the literature, even if slightly on the more-
selfish side. A total of 56 Player A participants (32%) selected to keep the entire 
allotment for themselves, while 38 (21%) opted for an equal division. Only a small 
handful (n=9, 5%) of individuals transferred over half of the bonus to their Player B 
counterpart. 
  
Finally, on the harm and fairness questions, this is what we found. On the generic 
harm question, where we asked both Player A and Player B participants whether a 
dictator who transfers zero has in some way harmed their counterpart, 43% of Player 
A participants and 48% of Player B participants responded that such transfers would, 
in fact, do harm. So, although subjects are split as to whether exceptionally low offers 
in the dictator game result in a harm to the recipient, we found that a sizeable portion 
of subjects thought that such low transfers would do harm. And the fact that there is 
such a small difference in the attitudes of dictators and recipients on this matter, even 
though some of those dictators would have just decided to make a zero transfer, is 
noteworthy.  Furthermore, 19% of Player As thought their chosen allocation harmed 
their counterpart while 31% of Player B participants thought Player A’s choice harmed 
them. We found that Player As and Player Bs were actually split on whether they found 
Player A’s transfer to be fair, with 71% of the dictators reporting that it was fair but 
only 42% of receivers saying it was fair. As a further comprehension check, we isolated 
the Player A’s who kept all of the bonus, and noticed that all 56 of them gave the same 
answer on the specific harm and generic harm questions, as we should expect if they 
fully understood the task and questions. 
  
3.2 Experiment 2 (the “Non-Identity Dictator Game”) 
  
Our second experiment investigates a variant of the standard dictator game designed 
to add identity-affecting considerations into the choice problem. As in Experiment 1, 
a dictator (Player A) was allocated $1.00 to divide. However, unlike the previous 
experiment, there were a total of 11 Player B participants paired with each Player A 
participant. We refer to these 11 experimental subjects as the Player B Group, and 
assign each member a label of B0, B1, …, B10. Each of the members of the Player B 
Group was matched to a particular outcome of the dictator game: Player B0 was 
matched to the outcome where Player A transfers no funds, Player B1 was matched to 
the outcome where Player A transfers $0.10 to their counterpart, and so on. Like 
before, Player A then selected an allocation, which was later revealed to the member 
of the Player B Group who was pre-determined to receive that amount. And this 
revelation was the only form of contact between the Player As and any members of 
their respective Player B Groups in the experiment. 
  
Those Player B Group participants that did not match the selected allocation were 
simply paid the $0.50 participation fee and asked to take an unrelated survey. These 
Player B participants were not provided with any information about the game they had 
just “participated” in or the behaviour of the Player A they were paired with. In other 
words, all but one of Player B Group participants were kept completely ignorant of 
the underlying strategic scenario. Importantly, each Player A was explicitly told that 
those members of the Player B Group not matched to the selected allocation would 
never find out about Player A’s behaviour. As a result, this variation of the game 
mimics some of the salient identity-affecting considerations that generate the non-
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identity problem. Player A’s decision not only determines both how much money is 
transferred but also which individual will be drawn into the strategic scenario in the 
first place. And, importantly, any member of a Player B Group chosen to receive a 
bonus through this process, and thus drawn into the strategic scenario, had no chance 
of doing any better than she did. If Player A had chosen a more generous allocation, a 
completely different member of the Player B Group would have reaped that reward. 
 
To make these details a bit more concrete, figure 1 visually sketches the difference 
between the choice problem faced by Player A in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
Hereafter, we will refer to the former as the “standard dictator game” and the latter as 
the “non-identity dictator game”. 
 
  
 
     (a)                  (b) 
 
Figure 1: Representation of the choice problem faced by Player A in the standard 
dictator game (a) and non-identity dictator game (b) 
  
As noted earlier, when standard dictator games are run in the lab, subjects don’t tend 
to act as we would expect them to act if we were to assume that subjects are entirely 
self-interested and care only about maximising their monetary reward. This is indeed 
what we found in our standard dictator game, and this suggests that our subjects were 
driven at least partially by other regarding behaviour. The question is whether the 
identity-affecting nature of our non-identity variant of the dictator game will have a 
noticeable effect on the behaviour of our subjects. We now turn to the results of our 
experiment after a brief discussion of the exact experimental set-up. We then compare 
behaviour in the standard dictator game to that in the non-identity dictator game. 
 
3.2.1 Experiment 2: Set-up 
  
As was the case in experiment 1, we once again used subjects from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (and limited our subjects to those using IP addresses in the United 
States). We recruited a total of 176 Player A participants and 1936 Player B participants. 
Once again, all interactions took place over the online interface, and all subjects’ 
anonymity was guaranteed. All subjects received a $0.50 participation fee upon 
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successful completion of the experiment and were told that there was a possibility they 
could receive up to an additional $1.00. On average, the experiment took the active 
subjects (i.e., either those selected as Player A or those selected from the Player B 
group through Player A’s choice) an average of just over four minutes to complete. 
  
Player A participants were presented with a detailed description of the non-identity 
dictator game (described above). They were then administered a three-question quiz 
to ensure they not only understood how their choice affected their own compensation, 
but also determined which of the 11 Player B participants would receive the relevant 
allocation. Participants had to correctly answer all of these comprehension questions 
before they were allowed to proceed through the rest of the experiment. Those who 
passed the comprehension test were then allowed to choose their preferred allocation, 
given a slightly revised set of debriefing question, and a demographic survey. 
  
As noted earlier, the 11 Player B Group participants were each randomly assigned to 
one of the 11 possible allocations. The Player B Group participant who corresponded 
to allocation chosen by the Player A they were paired with (whom we shall refer to as 
the ‘active Player B’) was told about the experimental set-up and was also required to 
complete the set of comprehension questions.10 The active Player B was then informed 
of their predetermined position in the Player B group and that their position matched 
Player A’s allocation. All of the remaining participants of the Player B Group were 
simply given an unrelated survey to complete and paid the $0.50 participation fee. 
  
The final task for Player As and active Player Bs was an exit survey, which was once 
again required for payment. The survey included slightly revised versions of the 
specific harm, generic harm, and fairness questions from Experiment 1, and the same 
demographic questions.11 
  
3.2.2 Experiment 2: Results 
  
We found that on average Player As transferred $0.155. A total of 81 Player As (45%) 
selected to keep the entire endowment for themselves, while only 21 (12%) opted for 
an equal division. Only a small handful of individuals transferred over 50% of their 
endowment to their Player B counterpart (n=6, 3%). Regarding the responses to the 
harm/fairness questions, 85% of Player As and 77% of active Player Bs responded 
negatively to the generic harm question. This indicates that subjects by and large do 
not think zero offers in the non-identity dictator game result in any harm to Player B0. 
On the specific harm question, we found that 92% of Player As thought they did not 
harm the recipient who would receive the transfer, while 84% of active Player Bs 
                                               
10 The information about the experimental set-up given to active Player Bs was different from the 
information Player As received in two important ways. First, active Player Bs were not initially told 
exactly which role they were selected to play in the game, leaving open the possibility that they might 
have been selected as Player A. (Player A’s knew their position from the outset.) Second, active Player 
B’s were not told that all members of the Player B group not chosen according to Player A’s selection 
would never be told about their participation in the game. These changes were necessary because of the 
concern that most of the savvier active Player Bs, if told either explicitly or implicitly about their 
position, would drop out of the study before completing the comprehension questions, thus biasing 
that half of our sample.  
11 See supplementary materials for details of the exact wording changes, available at [To Be Posted]. 
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thought the transfer didn’t harm them. The latter is rather surprising, given that offers 
were very low on average. On the fairness question, 68% of player As and 57% of 
active Player Bs took the transfer to be fair. We did a similar comprehension check as 
before, and found that only one of the 81 Player As who chose to keep the whole 
bonus answered the specific and generic harm questions differently, suggesting a very 
high level of comprehension. 
  
3.3 Comparison of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
  
Here is a comparison between the behaviour and attitudes of participants in the 
standard dictator game and those in the non-identity dictator game. First, Player As 
were significantly more generous in the standard dictator game than Player As in the 
non-identity version. Figure 2 nicely illustrates this difference. In particular, many more 
Player As were willing to take an even split in the standard dictator game than in the 
non-identity version, and many more Player As opted to make exceptionally low 
transfers in the non-identity dictator game than in the standard version. This clearly 
suggests that, at least in the aggregate, identity-affecting choice problems tend to 
generate more self-interested behaviour on the part of the dictator. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of player A transfers in standard and non-identity dictator 
games, with transfers above $0.50 omitted (n=9, 6, respectively) 
 
Attitudes about harm were also substantially different between the two experiments. 
Both Player As and Player Bs were significantly more likely to register a harm in the 
standard dictator game than in the non-identity dictator game despite the fact that 
offers in the non-identity game were on the whole much lower than those made in the 
standard dictator game. As noted, a total of 31% of Player Bs in the standard dictator 
game felt they were harmed by the specific transfer they received from their Player As. 
But only 16% of active Player Bs in the non-identity version felt harmed by their 
corresponding Player As’ choice of allotment. Likewise, substantially more Player As 
in the standard dictator game felt their behaviour resulted in harm than Player As in 
the non-identity version (19% compared to 8%, respectively). 
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Figures 3 and 4 provide a more fine-grained look at the harm attitudes of both Player 
A and Player B participants. In particular, for both experiments we list the proportion 
of Player A and Player B participants who believed that low transfers (i.e., $0.30 or 
less) resulted in harm. We find that, in these kind of low transfers, both players in the 
non-identity dictator game were much less likely to think that harm was done than 
their counterparts in the standard version. This difference can be quite substantial. 
  
 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of Player Bs receiving a low transfer who believed the transfer 
did them harm 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of Player As giving a low transfer who believed the transfer did 
the recipient harm 
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Finally, all subjects in the standard dictator game were more likely than subjects in the 
non-identity dictator game to agree with the statement that a Player A participant who 
transfers $0 to her counterpart harms her counterpart (45% vs. 19%). 
 
 
4. Practical Implications for the Non-identity Problem 
 
These studies were ultimately intended to probe the practical importance of the non-
identity problem. Recall that various authors claim that the non-identity problem is of 
great practical importance, and yet this claim is slightly puzzling, given other claims 
made in the literature. In particular, a widespread assumption made in the literature is 
that the paradigm identity-affecting actions seem to carry most of the same intuitively 
immoral features as their parallel same-person actions. Even authors who ultimately 
argue that such intuitions are mistaken also admit to sharing the intuition. But if the 
public generally shares these intuitions of the philosophers, we should expect that the 
realization that they are in an identity-affecting choice problem would make little 
difference to their respective moral evaluations and actions. In other words, if they 
saw a certain choice as being immoral in the first place, that choice should still seem 
immoral once they realize it is an identity-affecting choice. And even if the public’s 
intuitions are slightly different from those of philosophers, there is another reason for 
caution: the public might not generally be able to grasp that a choice is identity-
affecting in the first place. Grasping the non-identity problem, after all, requires some 
rather sophisticated reasoning. And if the public generally cannot grasp that they are 
in an identity-affecting choice problem, it’s unlikely that the identity-affecting nature 
of the problem will cause any changes in actual behaviour.  
 
So what do the data from our study suggest about the practical implications of the 
non-identity problem? Let’s start with the latter point about the public’s ability to track 
the identity-affecting nature of a choice problem. First, if the public generally was 
incapable of tracking whether they are in an identity-affecting choice problem, then 
we would expect it to be very difficult for participants to complete the comprehension 
questions in the non-identity dictator game. While we did notice that participants in 
the non-identity version failed more comprehension questions overall, we only 
required roughly 33% more trials (622 for Standard vs. 824 for Non-ID) to collect 
roughly the same number of data points (354 for Standard vs. 352 for Non-ID). This 
suggests that while there is indeed some portion of the population that finds such 
details difficult to follow, it is certainly not a large enough proportion to support the 
claim that the general public is so naive that we should expect identity-affecting choices 
to make very little impact on their behaviour. And the substantial portion who make 
it through the comprehension question are clearly capable of seeing the normative 
difference in an identity-affecting choice problem. For example, the substantial drop 
in the proportion of those who think that a 0 offer harms the player given 0, which 
went down to 19% from 45% in the standard version, suggests that these participants 
are able to track the moral intricacies of the choice problem. A substantial portion of 
the population is fully able to track the morally relevant features of identity-affecting 
choice problems. 
  
Do the data suggest that the identity-affecting nature of a choice problem has an effect 
on the public’s behaviour? We believe they clearly do. First, there was a rather 
pronounced drop in giving behaviour, from a mean of $0.238 to $0.155. Although a 
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8.3 cent drop in giving might not seem so drastic in absolute terms, it is worth noting 
that this is a decrease in total giving of roughly one third. This was paired with a 13 
percentage point increase in Player As who took the whole pie for themselves and a 7 
percentage point increase in those who took the vast majority of the pie (i.e., 80 or 90 
percent of the bonus). Even offers, i.e., Player As that kept exactly half of the pie for 
themselves, decreased by 9 percentage points (from 21% in the standard dictator to 
12% in the Non-ID version). These results suggest that a substantial portion of the 
population does see a moral difference when facing an identity-affecting choice 
problem. In particular, when placed in an identity-affecting choice problem, they are 
less willing to make altruistic sacrifices for the sake of those on the other side.  
 
We must admit that the kinds of effects we saw in our identity affecting choice problem 
are merely suggestive of what we might see when dealing with large scale identity-
affecting problems like when a nation is deciding on climate change policy. 
Nonetheless, we do think they give us some good reasons to be careful with how we 
choose to motivate actions aimed at future generations. The fact that our subjects in 
the identity-affecting choice problem were substantially more selfish suggests that the 
public will be less willing to make even small sacrifices when faced with such a 
problem. In practical terms, this could easily equate to an unwillingness to accept small 
tax increases, or small price increases on certain products, etc. And although the 
increased selfishness was far from uniform across our subjects, it was certainly enough 
to make a policy difference in a population like the US or Australia, where support for 
these kinds of policies comes in at close to an even split among the voting population. 
In such a context, broadcasting the identity-affecting nature of our various choice 
problems, like those involved in climate policy, is likely to have negative consequences. 
And the fact that the increases in selfish behaviour appear to correlate with a decreased 
perception of having harmed anyone gives us a reason to be cautious when we attempt 
to motivate the population to support conservationist policies by pointing to the harms 
that inaction could cause over very long timeframes.12 Such motivational efforts are 
likely to be especially foolhardy if philosophers continue to broadcast the identity-
affecting nature of such policies. What we’ve uncovered through this study suggests 
caution is due on both fronts.  
 
 
5. Implications for Normative Reasoning on Harm 
 
Much of the literature on the non-identity problem is entangled with the literature on 
harm. In particular, when Parfit (1984) set the stage, the non-identity problem was 
deemed a problem because of the common-sense notion of harm that we tend to 
employ in our moral theorizing. This common-sense notion of harm, often referred 
to as the counterfactual comparative account, holds that to harm someone is to make 
them worse off than they would have been otherwise. And in a non-identity case, it’s 
not true that you’ve made the relevant person or people worse off than they would 
                                               
12 This is not to say that we should also be cautious when using shorter term harm considerations to 
motivate the population toward conservationist policies. There are many green policy choices where a 
failure to act now causes harm to individuals who will exist no matter which policy is enacted, since they 
work on a much shorter timeframe. Our continued failure to curb our use of coal-burning power 
generation is a clear example, since our inaction will harm many individuals over the coming decades 
due simply to respiratory disease.  
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have been otherwise. After all, if you had made the other available choice, that person, 
or those people, wouldn’t have existed. So, if this counterfactual comparative account 
of harm is correct, then there’s no legitimate sense in which you’ve harmed the person 
in a non-identity case. This gets the whole problem rolling. As noted in Section 2, one 
way to solve the non-identity problem would thus be to devise a generally acceptable 
account of harm that entails that the affected individuals in non-identity cases are 
actually harmed after all. So various authors have seen the non-identity problem as a 
problem for the counterfactual comparative account of harm, and thus as a reason to 
seek out alternative accounts of harm (e.g., Harman 2004, 2009; Shiffrin 2009; Gardner 
2015).  
 
We admit that our non-identity dictator game doesn’t place our subjects into a non-
identity case in the exact same sense as the individuals involved in the cases used in 
the above debates. After all, the members of the Player B group don’t fail to come into 
existence when they aren’t chosen to receive a benefit. We think this disanalogy, strictly 
speaking, doesn’t impede our ability to make predictions about how the public’s 
behaviour could change if the non-identity problem were made salient, but we can 
imagine others might not be so optimistic. Regardless of how crucial one believes the 
strict disanalogy with the non-identity problem to be, the choice problem we’ve 
generated in our game can nonetheless offer some insight into which notions of harm 
members of the public are employing in their normative reasoning. So here we will 
look at some of the competing accounts of harm that have been proposed in the 
literature and examine what the data we’ve collected could tell us about which notions 
of harm might be affecting the public’s behaviour.  
 
First, it will be helpful to have a precise statement of the what those like Parfit take to 
be the common-sense account of harm:  
 
Counterfactual Comparative Account: A’s act harms B if and only if A’s act 
makes B worse off than B would have been otherwise. 
 
The main competitor for the counterfactual comparative account in the literature is 
typically referred to as the non-comparative account of harm, which we could state as:  
 
Non-comparative Account: A’s act harms B if and only if A’s act causes B to 
be in an intrinsically bad state.13  
 
                                               
13 To avoid confusion, we should point out that one of the main authors who is typically associated with 
non-comparative accounts of harm in the literature, namely Harman (2004, 2009), would likely not 
endorse the formulation we give here. For her to offer a solution to the non-identity problem, she only 
requires that placing someone into an intrinsically bad state is sufficient for the act to count as doing 
harm, as should be clear from what we say below. She doesn’t require that it is also necessary. And 
others who endorse non-comparative accounts might be similarly hesitant. But nonetheless, the public 
might be employing a notion of harm where an act wouldn’t count as doing harm unless the act causes 
those affected to be in an intrinsically bad state. Just as an aside, we note that if one endorses a non-
comparative account of harm on which placing another into an intrinsically bad state is sufficient by 
not necessary for harm, such a view would fail to bypass some of the drawbacks of counterfactual 
comparative accounts that have been pointed out in the literature. For example, it would allow that 
failing to benefit might still count as a harm. (We discuss this supposed drawback below). We thank 
David Boonin for insisting we make it clear that we are not intending this account to represent Harman’s 
view of harm. 
18 
 
To give an example of how these two accounts of harm can come apart, think back to 
the example of Wilma, Pebbles, and Rocks from earlier. In that scenario, if Wilma 
decided to conceive a child immediately, then she’d have Pebbles, and Pebbles would 
be born incurably blind. But if Wilma decided to delay conceiving and receive 
treatment for a few months, she’d conceive Rocks who would be unencumbered by 
that disability. But Wilma decided to conceive early anyway, bringing Pebbles into 
existence. On the counterfactual comparative account, Wilma hasn’t harmed Pebbles 
with her decision, since it’s not the case that Pebbles would have been better off if 
Wilma had decided otherwise. If she had waited, Rocks would have been born instead. 
But the non-comparative account has a very different verdict. By choosing to conceive 
early, as opposed to waiting for the treatment to kick in, she has caused a child to be 
in an intrinsically bad state.14 So Pebbles is indeed harmed by Wilma’s decision to 
conceive early.  
 
Although these are the two main accounts of harm in the literature, there is one other 
account that is worth mentioning. This account, which is often called the temporal 
comparative account, could be stated as:  
 
Temporal Comparative Account: A’s act harms B if and only if A’s act makes 
B worse off than B was before A’s act occurred.  
 
Philosophers tend to quickly discredit this account as a legitimate notion of harm, due 
to the various supposed counterexamples that are fairly easy to devise (e.g., Hanser 
2008, Thomson 2011 and Shiffrin 1999, although see Foddy 2014 for a defence). But 
since we are interested in which notions of harm play a role in the normative reasoning 
of the public, the existence of philosophical counterexamples doesn’t give us a reason 
to toss out the concept. It’s well known that the public uses various deeply problematic 
concepts in their normative thinking. So here we’ll treat the temporal comparative 
count as a live alternative.  
 
So what can the data from our study tell us about which notions of harm the public 
employ? Let’s start with our subjects’ attitudes about harm in the standard dictator 
game. In the standard version, there is no sense in which Player B is put into an 
intrinsically bad state when Player A takes all of the bonus money for herself. After all, 
Player B will still get the show up fee. So if the public predominantly employed a non-
comparative notion of harm in their normative thinking, we would expect a very low 
percentage of our subjects in to think that a 0 transfer harms Player B. We found quite 
the contrary. Since 45% of our subjects in the standard dictator game believed that a 
0 transfer harmed Player B, this suggests that a rather substantial portion of the 
population employs something akin to a counterfactual comparative notion of harm 
in their normative thinking.15  
                                               
14 As suggested earlier, it’s assumed in the literature that incurable blindness is an intrinsically bad thing 
for someone to have. If the reader disagrees, the original example could have been modified, swapping 
blindness with an impairment the reader accepts is intrinsically bad. It’s likely that such a reader wouldn’t 
have seen the force of the non-identity case in the first place, and so we would have had to make such 
a modification at that earlier stage anyway.  
15 We admit that there is a possible wrinkle with this inference. It could be that when the subjects say 
that a 0 transfer does harm, it might be because they are making a prediction about how the Player B in 
such a scenario will react to receiving nothing. If they think such a result would make that Player B 
angry, and if they think being angry is an intrinsically bad state, they might register that it’s a harm even 
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Notice further that one way to frame what is going on when Player A takes the whole 
bonus for herself is that she is failing to benefit the Player B she was paired with. Many 
philosophers have a strong intuition that simply failing to benefit someone is very 
different from harming that person, and this intuition has been used as a motivation 
to reject the counterfactual comparative account, since it tends to conflate the two. 
For example, Bradley (2012), who calls this the “problem of omission”, rejects the 
counterfactual account on just these grounds. (Although see Feit 2017 for critique of 
Bradley’s argument.) It turns out that a substantial portion of the population doesn’t 
seem to share this intuition, since they are happy to diagnose something that is a clear 
case of failing to benefit as an instance of harming. This, perhaps, suggests that we 
should proceed with some caution before rejecting the counterfactual comparative 
account of harm based solely on the problem of omission, although we don’t intend 
to take a stand on which notion of harm is the “correct” one here. 
 
The substantial drop in harm perceptions when we move to the non-identity dictator 
game further supports the claim that a substantial portion of the population employs 
a counterfactual comparative account of harm. Recall that a much smaller proportion 
of Player As believe they have harmed the member of the Player B Group with their 
offer, even though the offers were on the whole much lower. And we also saw a 
sizeable drop in the proportion of subjects that thought that a 0 transfer does harm. 
Both of these facts further support the claim that something like the counterfactual 
comparative notion of harm is playing a role in these subjects’ normative thinking.16  
 
But we think the data also suggest that an even larger portion of the population 
employs some other notion of harm. For example, 55% of subjects in our standard 
dictator game didn’t think that Player A did harm by taking the whole bonus, which 
you wouldn’t expect if these subjects employed a counterfactual comparative notion. 
So although our study suggests some limits on what portion of the population could 
be using these notions of harm, our data don’t help us distinguish which of the 
alternative accounts this portion of the population employs. While it’s true that a Player 
B who is given no bonus is not caused to be in an intrinsically bad state, it’s also true 
that she isn’t made worse off than she was before she was given no bonus. After all, 
she started out with no bonus. Thus, this portion of our subjects could just as well be 
utilizing a temporal comparative notion of harm as a non-comparative one.17 In future 
                                               
if they employ a non-comparative notion of harm. We think it’s rather unlikely that this is the main 
explanation of the responses, given that all participants are aware that even the subjects given a 0 transfer 
will still take away a show up fee, which we set at a higher rate than the average show up fee for MTurk 
studies. But we are devising ways to tease out and test this possibility in future studies. We thank David 
Boonin for raising this suggestion.  
16 The possible wrinkle mentioned in the previous note might apply here as well. It could be that subjects 
who are employing an anger-based non-comparative account, if you will, are predicting that someone 
given a 0 transfer wouldn’t be angry in the Non-identity version, perhaps because such a Player B should 
realise they couldn’t have done any better than a 0 transfer. Like before, we think this kind of story is 
unlikely to be the right explanation of the shift, but we’re looking into ways to examine the possibility 
further. Thanks, again, to Boonin for pointing out this possibility. 
17 David Boonin has pointed out to us that there may be another competitor, which he tells us he sees 
hints of in class discussions on related topics. This competitor is a kind of morally laden counterfactual 
comparative account, which diagnoses an act as doing harm if and only if the act wrongfully makes an 
individual worse off than she would have been otherwise. If we take this as another competitor, we 
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work, we are devising questions to allow us to tease apart which of these competitors 
this substantial portion of the population are using. Additionally, a non-negligible 
portion of our subjects in the non-identity dictator still thought that a Player A who 
keeps the whole bonus harms Player B0 by making that choice (19%). We wouldn’t 
really expect this on any of the notions of harm covered here (including the possible 
contender mentioned in note 17). It could very well be that there is a notion of harm 
that is playing a role in the public’s normative thinking that philosophers have thus far 
completely ignored. Further study is needed to tell if this is the case, or if, instead, this 
group we found amounts to merely noise in the data.  
 
 
6. Objections and Replies 
 
In this section, we address some objections that raise questions about the relevance of 
our results to the philosophical debates we are engaging with. First, one might object 
that our study isn’t as relevant to the non-identity problem in the context that originally 
motivated our enquiry, namely the context of climate change policy. In particular, a 
number of philosophers working on the non-identity problem have noted the 
difference between what we might call “personal” and “impersonal” identity-affecting 
cases (e.g., Boonin 2014, Weinberg 2014). In personal cases, like the case of Wilma 
discussed in Section 2, the actor can easily conceive of a concrete individual who 
predictably will be affected by the identity affecting choice. On the other hand, in 
impersonal cases, like the choice between Policy C and Policy D, the agent at issue is 
considering the effects the choice predictably will have upon an large and amorphous 
body of possible people, each of which would be difficult to conceive of in any 
concrete way. And as previous authors have pointed out (e.g. Weinberg 2014), our 
intuitions may justifiably be quite different in these two kinds of identity-affecting 
cases. If so, this could give us a reason to think that the population will also exhibit 
markedly different behaviour in these two kinds of cases. This would, in turn, threaten 
to undermine the relevance of our study, understood as a personal identity-affecting 
case, to the impersonal identity-affecting case of climate change policy.  
 
In reply, although we admit that there is an intuitive difference between personal and 
impersonal identity-affecting cases, we note that it is important to properly track the 
directional shift of the intuitions at issue. Most authors who raise the 
personal/impersonal distinction do so in order to argue that our intuitions are on 
firmer ground in the personal case. As the story goes, we tend to have a stronger 
intuition that Wilma has done something immoral when she chooses to conceive of 
blind Pebbles than that the US has done something wrong when choosing Policy D 
(i.e. “Depletion”). But notice that the shift here goes from a stronger intuition of 
having done wrong in a personal identity-affecting case than an impersonal identity-
affecting case. So while the objector above may have rightly found a trace of 
disanalogy, it turns out to be largely beside the point. If our subjects’ intuitions or 
wrongness are supposed to be stronger in the personal identity-affecting case than an 
impersonal one, then claiming that our study is more parallel to a personal identity-
affecting case actually strengthens our argument. Since we saw a marked change in 
                                               
should note that our data likely also don’t distinguish between this version of a counterfactual account 
and the temporal or non-comparative account. After all, our subject might admit that a 0 transfer makes 
Player B worse off than she would have been otherwise, and yet not think that it does so wrongfully.  
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behaviour in our study, if we follow the objector here in thinking it’s more like a 
personal case, we should expect an even larger effect when the other “players in the 
game” are amorphous, unidentifiable, and inconceivable future beings.  
 
A second, more challenging objection one might raise against the relevance of our 
study to the non-identity problem in the context of climate change policy would be to 
point out a possibly relevant difference between the harms involved, which could cause 
a corresponding difference in behaviour. As we admitted earlier in Section 5, many 
philosophers will think that there simply isn’t any harm done in either of our dictator 
games, since they believe there is a drastic difference between failing to benefit 
someone and actually harming her. On such a picture, the subjects in our study that 
think harm can be done in the dictator game are simply confused. But the objector we 
have in mind here takes our subjects at their word and then tries to show that the 
behaviour we saw in our study shouldn’t be expected to scale up to the case of climate 
change policy. In particular, if not being given any slice of a very small monetary pie 
can be rightly seen as a harm, it certainly isn’t much of a harm. And when we move 
from the standard dictator game over to the identity-affecting version, the specific 
details of the change might be enough to wash out the tiny amount of harm that was 
originally registered by our participants. On the other hand, being left with an 
environment that is severely degraded and badly depleted of its resources would seem 
like a much more serious harm. So, although we saw a marked change in attitude and 
behaviour between our two studies, with subjects exhibiting much more selfishness in 
the identity-affecting version, it could be that the seriousness of the perceived harms 
to future generations erases this change in bad behaviour. This objection attempts to 
diffuse our worry that the non-identity problem will make action on climate change 
more difficult by motivating the hopeful thought that the public will still want to avoid 
leaving a depleted and degraded planet for future generations, even after they fully 
grasp the puzzle.  
 
Our response to this objection is to admit that this is certainly a possibility, and it’s 
one that would need to be empirically tested before we could fully adjudicate the 
matter. It is true that even if we accept the subjects at their word in thinking that harm 
can be done in the dictator game, the harms are surely minor. If we wanted to test 
whether the kind of behaviour we found in our study is likely to scale up, we would 
need to substantially raise the stakes. One possibility would be to run a version of the 
studies where bonus money is endowed on both sides of the player gap, and where 
Player A must take the bonus money away from Player B (or the Player B group) if 
she wants to get the “full” bonus. (For this version of the dictator game, see List 2007.) 
A second would be to simply up the stakes in the game, from say $0.50 to $100. If we 
were to see more similar behaviour between the standard and identity-affecting games 
under either of these variants than we saw in our versions, then this might speak in 
favour of the objector here.18 Finally, we could retreat from the behavioural games and 
simply poll subjects about whether they see a relevant moral difference between 
identity-affecting cases with low stakes (like those involving money) and those with 
higher stakes (like those involving general well-being). As we noted earlier, we probably 
shouldn’t conclude anything too strong from the answers we receive from such 
questionnaires, since our interest is ultimately in behaviour, and what subjects predict 
                                               
18 We are currently devising variants of the study with somewhat higher stakes, although resource 
limitations admittedly make variants with very high stakes somewhat infeasible.  
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about their own behaviour can drastically come apart from how they actually behave. 
But, all the same, this indirect method might be the best available way to further probe 
this question, given the legitimate moral constraints against doing harm in the lab. But 
regardless of how we adjudicate the quality of this objection, it remains an empirical 
question left to be tested.  
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have tried to show that the non-identity problem does pose a 
potentially serious obstacle to moral motivations on problems like climate change. In 
particular, agents tend to act more selfishly when they find themselves in identity-
affecting choice problems, where they seem less willing to make small, altruistic 
sacrifices. If the kind of behaviour we uncovered scales up to large scale policy choices, 
then this would give us a good reason to take steps to limit the damage done by the 
identity-affecting considerations. We admit that the issue of whether the behaviour is 
likely to scale up is largely an empirical question—our studies are only intended to be 
suggestive of the problem that concerns us. But we hope that the behaviour we have 
uncovered is striking enough to motivate a further examination of how identity-
affecting considerations can influence how real people reason, decide, and behave 
when facing these kinds of moral problems.19 
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